1 African Ethics

Traditional African Ethics

Introduction:

Ethics, the study of moral values, principles, and conduct, encompasses diverse approaches across cultures. This chapter explores traditional African moral philosophy, drawing heavily on the work of prominent Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (Gyekye, 1996). Gyekye emphasizes the communitarian nature of African ethics while acknowledging the intrinsic value of the individual.

Character as the Foundation:

Concepts of good, bad, right, and wrong are central to African moral frameworks, just as in other cultures. In Akan, for example, pa signifies “good” while bone denotes “bad” or “evil.” Moral evaluations fundamentally reference a person’s character (suban). Honest, generous, and compassionate individuals possess good character, while dishonest, wicked, and cruel ones have bad character (Gyekye, 1996).

African ethics is fundamentally character-based, prioritizing the quality of an individual’s character as paramount in moral life. Good character is the essence of the moral system, shaping choices to obey moral rules and fulfill duties. All actions originate from a person’s character; wrongdoing is directly attributed to bad character. Maxims like “Good character is a person’s guard” emphasize this (Gyekye, 1996).

Character is acquired, not innate. One proverb states, “One is not born with a bad ‘head’, but one takes it on from the earth” (Gyekye, 1996). Habits formed through repeated actions shape character. Performing morally acceptable actions becomes habitual, leading to the acquisition of virtue (good character). This perspective is reflected in the saying aka ne ho, “it has remained with him,” meaning it has become his habit (Gyekye, 1996).

The Importance of Community:

Traditional African societies emphasize the importance of community in shaping moral values and identity. The community provides a framework for social interaction, transmits cultural norms, and fosters a sense of belonging. Key concepts include:

• Ubuntu: A Nguni Bantu term often translated as “humanity towards others,” Ubuntu emphasizes interconnectedness, compassion, and respect for all persons. It encapsulates the idea that a person is a person through other people.
• Communalism: This principle highlights the shared responsibility for the community’s well-being. Individuals are expected to contribute to the common good and prioritize the interests of the community over purely selfish desires.
• Ancestral veneration: The belief in the continued influence of ancestors on the living community reinforces social and moral norms. Ancestors are seen as guardians of tradition and morality, and their wisdom is sought through rituals and customs.

Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism:

Gyekye proposes a “moderate communitarianism” that balances the importance of community with the recognition of individual value (Gyekye, 1997). He argues that individuals are not merely absorbed into the community but possess inherent dignity and rights. This perspective is supported by the recognition of individual personhood and moral autonomy within a social context. Individuals are held responsible for their actions and are expected to contribute to the well-being of the community, implying individual agency and moral responsibility.

Menkiti’s Philosophy of Community and Personhood

Menkiti (1940-2019) was a Nigerian philosopher who became one of the most influential voices in African philosophy during the late 20th century. Born in Nigeria and educated in both Africa and the United States, Menkiti spent much of his career bridging traditional African thought with contemporary philosophical discussions. He taught at Wellesley College for many years and was also a published poet.

At the heart of Menkiti’s philosophy lies a fundamental question that might seem obvious at first: What does it mean to be a person? In Western philosophy, the answer often focuses on individual characteristics like rationality, consciousness, or self-awareness. If you can think and reason, you’re a person—end of story.

But Menkiti challenged this individualistic view by drawing from traditional African ethical systems, particularly those found in Igbo and other West African cultures. His revolutionary insight was that personhood isn’t something you’re simply born with—it’s something you achieve through your relationships and contributions to your community.

“I Am Because We Are”: The Community-First Approach

Menkiti’s most famous contribution to philosophy centers on what scholars call “strong communitarianism.” While Western thought typically starts with the individual and then asks how individuals form communities, Menkiti flipped this entirely. He argued that in traditional African thought, the community comes first, and individuals become who they are through their participation in communal life.

Think about it this way: instead of seeing yourself as a separate person who chooses to join groups, Menkiti suggests we should understand ourselves as emerging from the web of relationships, traditions, and responsibilities that surround us from birth. Your identity—who you are as a person—develops through fulfilling your obligations to family, neighbors, and the broader community.

One of Menkiti’s most striking claims is that personhood must be earned. In his view, biological humans aren’t automatically full persons in the moral sense. Instead, personhood is “attained in direct proportion as one participates in communal life through the discharge of the various obligations defined by one’s stations.”

This might sound harsh or strange to modern ears, but consider what Menkiti means. A newborn baby is certainly human and deserving of care and protection, but they haven’t yet developed the capacity for moral responsibility or community contribution. Similarly, an adult who consistently fails to meet their social obligations—who harms others or refuses to participate in communal life—has, in some sense, diminished their personhood.

Conversely, elders who have spent decades contributing to their communities, raising families, sharing wisdom, and fulfilling their responsibilities are considered to have achieved the fullest expression of personhood. This is why many African cultures hold elders in such high regard—they represent personhood at its most complete.^[1]

Moral Values and Principles:

Traditional African moral philosophy emphasizes a range of values and principles, including respect for life, respect for persons, honesty, truthfulness, justice, fairness, hospitality, and generosity. These values guide ethical conduct and contribute to a harmonious society.

Contemporary Relevance:

Traditional African moral philosophy offers valuable insights for contemporary ethical discourse. Its emphasis on community, interconnectedness, and respect for persons can contribute to addressing global challenges such as social inequality, environmental degradation, and conflict. Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism provides a framework for balancing individual rights with social responsibilities.

The Social and Humanitarian Nature of African Ethics:

Gyekye argues that African morality, with its focus on the welfare of each community member, is inherently a social morality (Gyekye, 1996). Social life is natural to humans, and individuals are naturally oriented towards others. This necessitates a social ethic, in contrast to an ethic of individualism.

This social ethic is reflected in numerous maxims emphasizing mutual helpfulness, collective responsibility, cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal obligations. Proverbs like “The well-being of man depends on his fellow man” highlight the importance of assisting others in achieving their goals (Gyekye, 1996). Human limitations necessitate cooperation, as expressed in the proverb “Man is not a palm-tree that he should be complete” (Gyekye, 1996).

The need for reciprocity is emphasized in maxims like “The right arm washes the left arm and the left arm washes the right arm” (Gyekye, 1996). Refusing to help others can result in being denied help oneself. The social ethic demands mutuality and reciprocity, recognizing human vulnerability. Altruism is a fundamental moral value.

Duty over Rights and Supererogation:

African ethics, being humanitarian and social, prioritizes duties over rights. The natural sociality of human beings prescribes an ethic of duty (or responsibility). Community life mandates a morality weighted on duty to others and the community. Duties are seen as arising from needs rather than rights. People fulfill duties because of the needs and welfare of others.

African ethics also rejects the concept of supererogation (acts “beyond the call of duty”). Given our shared humanity, limiting our moral duties is considered inappropriate. Humanitarian ethics aim to encompass both the morality of duty and moral ideals, such as compassion and benevolence. Such a morality makes no distinction between obligatory and optional acts, insisting that any morally good act conducing to the well-being of others should be considered a duty. This is reflected in the observation that in some African cultures, offering hospitality to guests is not seen as extraordinary but as a normal expectation (Campbell, cited in Gyekye, 1996).

Conclusion:

Traditional African moral philosophy, as articulated by Kwame Gyekye, provides a rich and nuanced perspective on ethics. It highlights the importance of community while also recognizing the intrinsic value of the individual. By understanding these ethical traditions, we can broaden our understanding of morality and contribute to a more just and compassionate world.

Further Reading:

• Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Temple University Press, 1995.
• Gyekye, Kwame. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford University Press, 1997.

Works Cited